China Media Bulletin: Issue No. 94
Freedom House’s biweekly update of press freedom and censorship news related to the People’s Republic of China
HIGHLIGHTS
* Party’s TV ‘self-criticism’ and militant rhetoric raise specter of Maoism
* Chinese state media, netizens take mild view of U.S. government shutdown
* Teenage netizen released after outcry amid social-media crackdown
* Apple removes circumvention tool as state reins in mobile news apps
* Prominent Japan-based Chinese scholar detained, editor missing
Freedom House’s biweekly update of press freedom and censorship news related to the People’s Republic of China
Issue No. 94: October 8, 2013
HIGHLIGHTS
* Party’s TV ‘self-criticism’ and militant rhetoric raise specter of Maoism
* Chinese state media, netizens take mild view of U.S. government shutdown
* Teenage netizen released after outcry amid social-media crackdown
* Apple removes circumvention tool as state reins in mobile news apps
* Prominent Japan-based Chinese scholar detained, editor missing
Photo of the Week: Fighting Graft with Kid Gloves
OTHER HEADLINES
* State media announce Bo Xilai verdict in choreographed rollout
* Netizens object as street vendor is executed for slaying officials
* Officials dash hopes of open internet in Shanghai free-trade zone
* ‘House Sister’ sentenced after online corruption exposé
* AMC owner Wanda Group plans massive film studio in China
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BROADCAST / PRINT MEDIA NEWS
Party’s TV ‘self-criticism’ and militant rhetoric raise specter of Maoism
President Xi Jinping’s “mass line” party discipline campaign, first launched in June (see CMB No. 89), has taken on new Maoist overtones thanks to a televised “self-criticism” session and the growing prominence of the term “public opinion struggle” in official rhetoric. On September 25, state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) aired a 24-minute segment about a recent self-criticism session by party officials in Hebei Province. The event was unusual in that such sessions are rarely televised, and because Xi himself presided over the exercise. Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post on September 28 published a chart tracking the various criticisms the officials applied to themselves and others, including not heeding the public’s view, overspending on event planning, and being too pushy. Barbara Demick of the Los Angeles Timesnoted that self-criticism sessions have a long history in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and that for those asked to participate, “the trick is to identify a fault that sounds plausible but not too embarrassing.” Indeed, no cadre admitted to more egregious but common abuses like embezzlement, bribery, or torture. While the Hebei session left some participants on the brink of tears, according to state media, it was greeted with derision by many netizens. One widely circulated video parody showed two toddlers in a martial arts match who never touch each other despite much punching and kicking. Analyst Zhang Lifan interpreted the CCTV broadcast as part of an effort by Xi to consolidate power ahead of a party plenum in November. The footage also bore a resemblance to recent televised confessions by leading bloggers in connection with a crackdown on internet commentary (see CMB No. 93). Meanwhile, the rise of the term “public opinion struggle” in mainstream party discourse stoked fears of greater repression in the country. The China Media Project in Hong Kong published a series of insightful essays analyzing the emergence of the militant term and its departure from the public opinion “guidance” or “channeling” favored under Xi’s predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. For many in China, the term “struggle” (douzheng) has especially violent and traumatic connotations, given its association with past CCP political campaigns including the antirightist movement in the 1950s, the Cultural Revolution of 1966–76, and the persecution of Falun Gong in more recent decades.
* South China Morning Post 9/28/2013: Sweating and on the verge of tears: Chinese officials carry out self-criticism on TV
State media announce Bo Xilai verdict in choreographed rollout
On September 22, state media and the Jinan Intermediate People’s Court announced that Bo Xilai, the former Chongqing Communist Party chief who was purged from the party leadership in early 2012, had been convicted and sentenced to life in prison for bribery, as well as 15 years for embezzlement and seven years for abuse of power. The announcement came about one month after the conclusion of Bo’s trial at the same court in Shandong Province (see CMB No. 92). The following day, CNN reported that Bo had appealed the verdict. The court announced the decision on its Sina Weibo microblog account, alongside a photograph of Bo in handcuffs standing before the three-judge panel. Footage of the hearing was aired by state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) as part of its flagship evening news program. The court’s microblog post was quickly shared over 10,000 times, and “Bo Xilai case” became the second most popular search term on Weibo. Minxin Pei, a China scholar at Claremont McKenna College in California, pointed out that the official Xinhua news agency had posted its announcement 40 seconds before the court, reinforcing the widely held belief that the final decision was made by political leaders in Beijing rather than by the judges in Jinan. Few observers were surprised by the guilty verdict, though the life sentence was harsher than many had initially anticipated and longer than the 15- and 18-year sentences handed down in past prosecutions of Politburo members. Some speculated that Bo received extra punishment because of his defiance during the trial. By contrast, state media like Xinhua and the People’s Daily touted the sentence as an example of justice being served amid President Xi Jinping’s anticorruption campaign. According to China Digital Times, on September 20, two days before the announcement, the Central Propaganda Department instructed media outlets to use only Xinhua copy when reporting on the verdict and to rein in the Weibo accounts of their employees. A number of netizens voiced their support for Bo, but according to Foreign Policy’s Isaac Stone Fish, posts by various government entities applauding the verdict were more common. Ahead of the announcement, some netizens initiated bets on the length of Bo’s prospective sentence, though such discussions were subsequently deleted by censors.
* Xinhua 9/22/2013: Bo Xilai sentenced to life in prison for bribery, embezzlement, power abuse
* CCTV 9/22/2013: 薄熙来一审被判处无期徒刑[Bo Xilai sentenced to life in prison]
* China Digital Times 9/20/2013: Ministry of Truth: Bo Xilai verdict
NEW MEDIA / TECHNOLOGY NEWS
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