The prime minister, who serves as the head of government, is elected by the National Parliament. Irregularities are frequent in the run-up to prime ministerial elections, known as “second elections.” Leading contenders usually separate into camps in Honiara’s major hotels and seek the support of other members of Parliament with promises of cash or ministerial portfolios.

Following the 2019 elections, Manasseh Sogavare won a fourth nonconsecutive term as prime minister. Solomon Islands Democratic Party (SIDP) leader Matthew Wale attempted to stop Sogavare’s selection, saying that he had relaunched the Ownership, Unity, and Responsibility Party (OUR Party) too late to meet the requirement that prime ministerial candidates maintain party membership. The High Court ultimately ruled Sogavare’s election lawful.

The National Parliament selects a governor-general to represent the British monarch as head of state for five-year terms. The governor-general appoints cabinet members on the advice of the prime minister. David Vunagi, a retired Anglican bishop, began his term in 2019.

The National Parliament’s 50 members are directly elected in single-seat constituencies by a simple majority vote to serve four-year terms.

In the 2019 elections, the SIDP and the Kadere Party each won 8 seats, while independents won another 21. Six smaller parties won the remainder. Days after the polls, in keeping with past patterns of party switching, support among lawmakers shifted to OUR Party, which then formed a governing coalition with Kadere, the Democratic Alliance, and the Solomon Islands People First Party. Commonwealth observers commended the overall conduct of the elections but called for voter-registration improvements and expanded early-voting options.

The legal framework generally provides for democratic elections. The Solomon Islands Electoral Commission (SIEC) had previously fallen under the jurisdiction of the Home Affairs Ministry but was placed under the prime minister’s office in 2020. The electoral rolls have been improved since the 2013 introduction of a biometric voter registration system.

In September 2022, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to delay the conclusion of members’ terms by seven months, from 2023 to 2024. Prime Minister Sogavare justified the delay by claiming that the financial burden of holding national elections and the Pacific Games in the same year was too high. Weeks before the amendment passed, Sogavare rejected an offer from the Australian government to help fund the upcoming elections, condemning it as an attempt to interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state.

There are no restrictions on the right to organize political parties, but political alliances are driven more by personal ties and local allegiances than formal policy positions or ideology. Party affiliations shift frequently, often as part of efforts to dislodge incumbent governments. Parliamentarians shifted their support to OUR Party after the 2019 elections, giving it a nearly two-thirds majority by the end of that year.

The 2014 Political Parties Integrity Act was meant to encourage a stronger party system through more formalized registration mechanisms. Many formerly party-aligned legislators stood as independents in the 2019 elections, calculating that doing so gave them greater flexibility under the legislation. Of the 333 candidates who took part in those polls, 170 ran as party candidates, while 163 ran as independents.

Opposition parties and candidates may campaign freely, and power shifts frequently between rival groups. Since 1978, three governments have been ousted in opposition-led no-confidence votes, and prime ministers have resigned to fend off no-confidence challenges on two occasions. Sogavare survived a no-confidence vote in December 2021, after riots took place in Honiara in late November of that year.

No incumbent prime minister has ever been able to win reelection, though both Sogavare and former prime minister Solomon Mamaloni were repeatedly able to return to power after a period in opposition.

In February 2023, Daniel Suidani was ousted as premier of Malaita Province through a no-confidence vote in the provincial assembly. His supporters claimed that the vote was orchestrated by the national government, of which he had been a vocal critic. In April, the national minister for provincial government disqualified Suidani from holding public office, explaining that the move was necessary because Suidani had failed to uphold the government’s recognition of Beijing and not Taipei under its “One China” policy. One provincial assembly member was secretly recorded admitting to having accepted bribes from the national government for backing the February no-confidence vote against Suidani.

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 because the premier of Malaita Province was ousted in a no-confidence vote and then barred from public office due to his opposition to the government’s close relationship with Beijing.

People’s political choices are generally unconstrained, though church and tribal leaders exert strong influence in some areas.

The Chinese government has sought to deepen ties with the Solomon Islands and won Honiara’s diplomatic recognition in 2019. Suidani, who denounced Honiara’s relations with Beijing, had aimed to hold an independence referendum for Malaita in 2022, though that did not occur. In December 2021, the organization Malaita for Democracy (M4D) was declared illegal based on allegations that individuals linked to the group had played a key role in the recent antigovernment riots. In April 2022, the Solomon Islands government signed a security deal with Beijing that reportedly allows the deployment of Chinese security forces to quell disorder and to protect foreign-owned assets, raising concerns that such forces could effectively protect Sogavare against domestic dissent.

Beijing provides financial backing for the Rural Constituency Development Fund (RCDF), which is disbursed by Solomon Islands parliamentarians. In July 2022, government reports revealed that the RCDF had expended SI$2.26 billion (US$268 million) between 2015 and 2022. Beijing is reportedly reluctant to continue the Taiwanese practice of delivering the RCDF resources through financial handouts to lawmakers, seeking instead to fund only constituency projects with full acquittals monitored by the Ministry of Rural Development. Taiwanese officials had attempted unsuccessfully to make similar changes as a safeguard against clientelism and corruption. Pressure to deliver cash to members of Parliament was expected to increase ahead of the elections scheduled for 2024.

Women and members of ethnic minorities enjoy full political rights under the law, but discrimination limits political opportunities for women in practice. Only four of the 50 seats in Parliament were held by women as of 2023. The criminalization of same-sex sexual activity and related societal bias present barriers to open political participation by LGBT+ people.

Solomon Islands governments have generally been able to determine national policy without outside interference, but the country’s fractious politics hamper efficient policymaking. Prime ministers have struggled to sustain legislative majorities, and cabinet splits are frequent.

Critics have raised concerns that the Solomon Islands has increasingly aligned itself with the Chinese government since Prime Minister Sogavare switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2019, opening up opportunities for Chinese authorities to improperly influence policy decisions.

Corruption and abuse of office are serious problems. The government of Prime Minister Rick Houenipwela (2017–19) secured passage of the Anti-Corruption Act, which called for an independent anticorruption commission, and the Whistleblowers Protection Act. Some opposition members of Parliament considered the laws ineffective, as they allowed the use of local custom as a defense in corruption cases and restricted retroactive application.

Under both the Sogavare and Houenipwela governments, a number of senior officials were investigated or arrested on corruption charges due to the efforts of Task Force Janus, a joint anticorruption initiative between the police force and the Finance Ministry. However, prosecutors have had difficulty winning convictions against politicians accused of corruption. Task Force Janus operations slowed beginning in 2020, while the Solomon Islands Independent Commission Against Corruption (SIICAC) has been largely inactive and underfunded since it was launched in 2019 with former governor-general Frank Kabui as its chair.

Successive governments have not operated transparently. State dealings with foreign logging and mining companies are not open to scrutiny. There is no law stipulating a formal process by which the public may request official information. Commonwealth observers who monitored the 2019 elections voiced concern over the possible misuse of the RCDF ahead of the campaign.

In March 2022, Transparency Solomon Islands chief executive Ruth Liloqula condemned the decision to sign a security agreement with China for having been taken without sufficient public consultation. Sogavare in turn denounced a leak of the security agreement prior to its signing, calling those responsible “lunatics” and “agents of foreign regimes.”

Local journalists have reported increasing secrecy among officials and difficulties in obtaining information from government ministries.

Press freedom has traditionally been respected, but the Sogavare government has taken steps to exert significantly greater control over the media. There are several print newspapers in operation, and subscription television services offer some local content in addition to foreign broadcasts. The government operates a national radio station, and subnational and private radio stations are also available.

In August 2022, the government announced that it would take more direct control over the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC). Staff at SIBC reported that the policy change required a government representative to vet all news programs before broadcast to protect citizens from “lies and misinformation.” The government subsequently claimed that no censors were vetting stories, but said they had pushed SIBC editorial decision-makers to “balance” their stories.

Later the same month, the government threatened to ban foreign journalists following an Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) investigative documentary into the Solomon Islands’ relationship with the Chinese government.

In July 2023, it was revealed that the Solomon Star newspaper had received nearly US$140,000 from the Chinese government in return for favorable coverage of Beijing’s development assistance to the country.

Freedom of religion is generally respected. Registration requirements for religious groups are not onerous, and religious education is not mandatory.

Academic freedom is generally respected.

While social taboos persist regarding the open discussion of topics including domestic violence, rape, and child abuse, individuals have historically been free to express their views on politics and other sensitive matters.

Freedom of assembly is constitutionally guaranteed and generally upheld. However, peaceful demonstrations can give way to civil unrest, particularly during contentious parliamentary debates, elections, or large-scale labor actions.

In August 2021, protesters in Honiara called for Prime Minister Sogavare’s resignation; businesses in the city, including in its Chinatown district, shuttered during the protest. Riots took place in Honiara over three days in November 2021, reportedly after Sogavare declined to meet with antigovernment demonstrators. Buildings in the city’s eastern areas and in Chinatown were damaged and destroyed, and four people were killed during the unrest. Peacekeepers were sent by Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea to help restore order at Sogavare’s request.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often operate informally, and the government is not always receptive to the viewpoints of governance-focused groups. Locally based NGOs often lack resources and reportedly grow dependent on the funds and priorities of international donors. Nevertheless, there are no major constraints on NGO activities in the Solomon Islands.

Workers are free to organize, and strikes are permitted with certain restrictions. Laws against antiunion discrimination by employers are reportedly ineffective. Though the country’s main labor union, the Solomon Islands National Union of Workers, was disbanded by court order in 2013, activists registered a new entity in 2014, the Workers Union of Solomon Islands (WUSI). A nurses’ union that was suspended by the government for striking amid the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 remained suspended as of 2023, reportedly contributing to the departure of many nurses for better-paying jobs overseas.

The judiciary has a reputation for independence, though a severe lack of resources has contributed to case backlogs. Judges are appointed by the governor-general on the advice of an impartial Judicial and Legal Service Commission. The Court of Appeal is mainly reliant on foreign judges.

Limited resources and capacity restraints are key factors behind the justice system’s somewhat common due-process deficiencies. About half of the country’s prison inmates are on remand awaiting trial due to case backlogs.

There are few major threats to physical security, though crime remains a problem in some areas. While the country has a history of internal conflict, the threat has subsided over the past two decades, thanks in large part to security aid from international partners.

The police force, which was disarmed in 2003, was entirely rebuilt with the help of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which launched that year. Mostyn Mangau became the first locally appointed police commissioner in 19 years when he took the post in 2020.

In the wake of the November 2021 riots, Chinese police were deployed in March 2022 to train Solomon Islands police officers in combat skills and emergency crowd management. The security agreement reached with China in April 2022 reportedly allows for the deployment of Chinese armed police to help control disturbances in the country and protect foreign-owned capital assets. In July 2023, the government reached another police cooperation agreement with Beijing, with provisions including assistance for the establishment of a forensic autopsy lab and the deployment of drones for crowd control and traffic management.

The government announced in September 2023 that Australian police, initially deployed after the 2021 riots, were scheduled to remain in the country at least until the elections scheduled for 2024.

The constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, place of origin, sex, and some other categories, but the legal framework does not provide robust protections. De facto discrimination limits economic opportunities for women. Same-sex sexual activity can be punished with up to 14 years’ imprisonment. While prosecutions are reportedly rare, the government has resisted international pressure to decriminalize such activity.

Discrimination based on regional differences also remains a factor. The Guadalcanal Plains Palm Oil Ltd. (GPPOL) operation on northern Guadalcanal, one of the country’s largest employers, avoids employing laborers from Malaita, even on a casual basis, for fear of antagonizing local communities.

Ethnic Chinese residents face discrimination as well. Buildings and businesses owned or operated by ethnic Chinese were targeted during the unrest following Sogavare’s appointment in 2019, while Honiara’s Chinatown district was largely destroyed during the November 2021 riots.

Residents generally enjoy freedom of movement, but some impediments exist, particularly in parts of rural Guadalcanal where people from Malaita were expelled during unrest in 1999–2000. Hostility to Malaitan settlement also persists in parts of Western Province.

The legal and regulatory framework largely supports property ownership and private business activity. However, property rights are frequently contested. GPPOL administrative buildings have been attacked in the past. Logging concessions have been disputed by local groups, as have tourism operations.

In 2020, Prime Minister Sogavare voiced his intention to restrict the sale of land to foreign buyers and bolster Indigenous land rights via constitutional amendments.

Individual freedoms on personal status issues such as marriage and divorce are generally protected. However, the legal age of marriage is 15, and about a fifth of women are married by age 18. Despite the 2014 Family Protection Act, which formally criminalized domestic violence and enabled victims to apply for protection orders, domestic violence and rape are serious and underreported problems. Victims are reluctant to take their cases to court.

Legal protections against exploitative working conditions are not consistently enforced, though authorities have made efforts to update and implement laws against human trafficking in recent years. Local and foreign women and children are vulnerable to sex trafficking and domestic servitude, including through forced marriages or “adoptions” to pay off debts. Migrant workers sometimes face forced labor in the mining, logging, and fishing industries.