Countries at the Crossroads 2007

At first glance, the Philippines might be perceived as a thriving democracy. Since its transition from authoritarian rule in 1986, general elections have been held in 1992, 1998, and 2004. Midterm elections—for positions ranging from the local level to the national Senate and House of Representatives—have been held on schedule in intervening years. The May 2004 elections involved a wide array of political parties and brought forth impressive levels of voter turnout. Civic involvement was extensive, as hundreds of thousands of volunteers went to polling stations to try to safeguard the electoral process. Midterm elections in May 2007 continued these patterns and resulted in substantial gains for the opposition in the Senate.

On the whole, Philippine democracy has combined popular exuberance with the major flaws of elite dominance and institutional weakness. The political structures implanted and nurtured under U.S. colonial rule in the early 20th century were characterized by the exclusion of the masses, patronage-infested political parties, a spoils system that undermined bureaucratic coherence, and (under the 1935 constitution) opportunities for overbearing executive authority. While suffrage expanded after independence in 1946, the country’s “cacique democracy” fell far short of the democratic ideal. In essence, there was rotation of power within the elite without effective participation by those at the bottom of highly inequitable socioeconomic structures.¹ Authoritarian enclaves could be found in many locales throughout the archipelago.

In 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos concentrated power in his own hands by declaring martial law. He proclaimed that he would replace the “old oligarchy” with his “New Society” and lay down stronger foundations for democratic renewal, but it soon became clear that his ultimate goal was the creation of a new oligarchy centered on his own family. By the time he was removed from office via the “People Power” uprising of 1986, the economy was a shambles. Incoming President Corazon Aquino (1986–1992) focused on restoring the structures of pre–martial law elite democracy, and the old clans stepped forward to reclaim their places in Congress. Aquino’s successor, former general Fidel Ramos (1992–1998), achieved substantial success in promoting important economic reforms through skillful manipulation of old-style patronage politics. Elements of a vibrant civil society, meanwhile, sought to keep up the pressure for much-needed social reforms.

When former movie star Joseph Estrada was elected to the presidency by a landslide in 1998, he promised material improvements for the masses but instead devoted his presidency to taking care of himself, his (multiple) families, and his cronies. Anger over allegations of corruption, abuse of power, and involvement with gambling syndicates led to impeachment proceedings. In January 2001, when the trial became stalled in the Senate, huge crowds took to the streets in protest. After the military withdrew support from his administration, Estrada left the palace and Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed the presidency with the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. She served out the remainder of Estrada’s term and was then elected to her own six-year term in 2004.

Analysis of recent trends suggests that Asia’s oldest democracy has become increasingly dysfunctional in several important ways. First, deepening concerns about the competence and integrity of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) have further undermined public confidence in its capacity to adjudicate election results with accuracy and fairness. While the Philippines has often exhibited deficiencies in electoral administration, these problems were manifested most dramatically in the May 2004 elections. More than a year later, in the wake of allegations that the president herself had played a role in fixing the vote count, the Arroyo government nearly collapsed. Second, the Philippines has dozens of political parties but no party system per se. Because most parties are loosely organized vehicles with little programmatic coherence, voters lack substantive choice when they cast their ballots. Politicians frequently move from one party or party alliance to another, and few parties have any serious institutional apparatus (it is notable that presidents give little attention to the development of their own ruling parties). Third, the influence of money and coercion skews electoral outcomes in favor of those who can successfully buy votes and/or coerce voters. Fourth, there is strong evidence of military involvement in the killings of hundreds of leftists, activists, and church personnel. In the wake of a recent fact-finding mission, a United Nations Special Rapporteur expressed concern about the impact of these killings on the democratic process: “It intimidates vast numbers of civil society actors, it sends a message of vulnerability to all but the most well connected, and it severely undermines the political discourse which is central to a resolution of the problems confronting this country.”² Fifth, press freedom is undermined by killings of journalists and a poor record of prosecuting those responsible. A more recent trend involves increasing numbers of libel suits against journalists by people close to the current administration. In light of these developments, many freedom indicators for the Philippines have declined since 2005.