Countries at the Crossroads 2007

In 2006 and early 2007, as if Colombian democracy needed another problem apart from its endemic violence, poverty, and lack of effective law enforcement, a new quandary emerged: hard evidence of the infiltration of paramilitary groups into elections and various branches of the government. Confronting the problem—which has long been suspected by many Colombians and external observers—acquired new urgency on March 11, 2006, when the National Prosecutor’s Office arrested Edgar Ignacio Fierro Florez, a lieutenant in the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a demobilized paramilitary group led by Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (alias Jorge 40).

Fierro Florez had in his possession cash, weapons, and, most important, two computers, two flash drives, many compact discs, and a series of handwritten documents. Lists of criminal and paramilitary activities in the Caribbean coastal area were among the files found on the computer, as well as a list of 558 assassinations carried out between 2003 and 2005 in Atlantico department. The recovered files also contained the names of politicians and merchants in Caribbean coastal departments with strong ties to Jorge 40’s paramilitary group.¹ In late 2006 and early 2007, what became known as the parapolitica (para-politics) scandal grew as evidence emerged that the paramilitary-political connections encompassed members of the National Congress, departmental assemblies, the office of the national prosecutor, large landowners, the armed forces, the national police, and even the Supreme Court.

In January 2007, the media published a document signed in July 2001 by four paramilitary leaders and 32 politicians calling for cooperation to work toward a new Colombia. This “Ralito Agreement” revealed complicity between paramilitary groups and future allies of the Uribe government. In February 2007 the press reported that a similar pact had been signed between 6 mayors and paramilitaries in Casanare department in the eastern part of the country,² leaving some to wonder how many other agreements there had been.

Colombia has suffered from the effects of a multi-sided civil war for decades. The largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), has been fighting a Marxist-based guerrilla war since the mid-1960s. Another, smaller leftist group, the Army of National Liberation (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, ELN), has also been active for decades. In the 1980s and 1990s, landowners increasingly began to collude with drug dealers as well as elements of the security services to provide a counter to the guerrillas in areas where state presence was weak. However, as these paramilitary groups, which eventually coalesced into the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), acquired strength and power, they were increasingly linked to brutal human rights violations, drug trafficking, and land seizures through coercive purchases or outright displacement. Under President Andres Pastrana (1998–2002), serious negotiations were attempted with the FARC, but these collapsed under the strain of unending violence.

The government of Alvaro Uribe Velez successfully challenged the FARC during his first term, engaging in a military offensive that pushed the rebels out of the main cities and deep into Colombia’s thick jungle and high mountains. Refusing to negotiate with insurgent groups unless they entered into ceasefires, Uribe also successfully carried out the demobilization of the AUC between 2004 and 2006. Over 30,000 paramilitary troops demobilized by the end of 2006, a number larger than expected by either the government or the AUC itself. The government had less success, however, with the FARC and the ELN. In the case of the FARC, the last half of 2005 and the first half of 2006 witnessed a surge of activity, though attacks slackened considerably in the run-up to the May presidential election. The little dialogue that occurred with the government centered on the possibility of an exchange of FARC kidnapping victims for imprisoned rebels.

On December 12, 2005, the governments of Spain, France, and Switzerland submitted a proposal to the government and the FARC secretariat suggesting a meeting between the two sides in the municipality of Pradera, in the Valle del Cauca department. During the conversations the only presence would be the negotiators of the two sides, the International Red Cross, and the “political organ,” made up of representatives of the three groups charged with the security of the zone. The Colombian government accepted this proposal almost immediately, but the FARC rejected it as insufficient. Although this was the first time that the Uribe government had agreed to demilitarize an area, it was not as large a zone as the FARC wanted. Messages between the two sides continued. There was cautious optimism until October 19, 2006, when the FARC set off a car bomb outside the Superior War College in Bogota. The Uribe government immediately suspended all discussions about prisoner exchange with the FARC.

In the case of the ELN, notable progress has occurred since September 12, 2005, when ELN leader Gerardo Antonio Bermudez Sanchez (alias Francisco Galan) was transferred from prison for three months to a “House of Peace” near Medellin so that he could take part in meetings with representatives of civil society. In November 2005 Galan stated in a formal communique that the ELN was ready to start a dialogue. In December 2005 Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo met with Galan and they agreed that the ELN and the government should meet outside Colombia. This phase between Colombia and the ELN began on December 16, 2005 in Cuba, with facilitators from Spain, Norway, and Switzerland. These ELN-government talks in Cuba continued throughout 2006, began again on February 22, 2007, and were set to continue throughout the year.