Putin's Vanishing Act?

Russian President Vladimir V. Putin has made clear that he will continue to play a guiding role in politics after he steps down next March and leaves the presidency to his chosen successor, First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri A. Medvedev. Perhaps he will accept Mr. Medvedev’s offer of the premiership and aggrandize that office accordingly. His decisions to date, and the record of authoritarian rulers in general, certainly suggest that he would be unwilling to yield any real control.

However, after making so many of his opponents disappear over the last eight years, Mr. Putin may be preparing to perform one last trick, this time on himself.

By encouraging the notion that he will be standing behind Mr. Medvedev’s throne, while actually planning to fade away once the new president is firmly seated, the wily former KGB agent would preserve his powers as a kingmaker and prevent a destructive free-for-all among his more ambitious lieutenants and other elite factions. He would also offer a novel formula for solving the persistent problem of succession in a non-democratic state.

The alternatives presented by the other former Soviet republics are not terribly attractive. Most involve amending the constitution through rigged referenda to allow endless presidential terms, an unseemly act for a regime that seeks to retain at least the pretense of European and democratic values. And in any case, this approach only delays the inevitable.

Turkmenistan’s tyrannical ruler died suddenly in office, reportedly the victim of a heart attack. Azerbaijan’s president lived long enough to hand power to his son, but even that option has its risks. The son-in-law of Kazakhstan’s president was forced into exile after apparently growing impatient for his chance at the helm. 

The worst-case scenario, of course, is that the people will become exasperated with life terms, rampant corruption, and fraudulent elections, and take to the streets to demand true democracy. They did so in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, when existing institutions failed to provide avenues for genuine public participation and political expression, let alone a regular rotation of power. But if Mr. Putin manages to pass the reins safely to a fresh-faced but loyal successor, using his own shadow to discourage potential rivals, he can retire in triumph and leave many voters with the impression that something has changed. Why stare down the riot police if the presidents keep leaving on time and there’s always a new leader just around the corner?

Russia has experienced a controlled transition before. However, when President Boris N. Yeltsin abruptly resigned in favor of Mr. Putin, his prime minister, he did so from a position of relative weakness, apologizing to the nation for his failures and leaving his successor to his own devices. By contrast, Mr. Putin would be exiting on a high note, with quite a bit of discretion as to the timing and degree of his departure.

The outgoing president has not yet agreed to become prime minister for a second time, and in one variant of the withdrawal plan outlined here, he would decline Mr. Medvedev’s offer at the last minute. Another variant would have him accept, but then depart as soon as the political situation had stabilized. Even if he had second thoughts about leaving for good, the reduced stature of the premiership, and the prospect of deferring at least symbolically to an ex-subordinate, could prove uncomfortable or untenable for him. Meanwhile, Mr. Medvedev would no doubt attract courtiers of his own, eager to promote their man.

Whatever solution Mr. Putin settles on, it is unlikely to provide Russia with long-term stability. Without basic democratic institutions like opposition parties, an independent judiciary, and a free press, the country’s bulging and graft-ridden executive branch will have little incentive to reform itself or improve governance. The state will continue to teeter dangerously on the fate of a single man, as its revenues depend on the world prices of oil and gas. And with energy prices kept artificially low at home to keep a disenfranchised population content, more and more of these vital resources will be lost to the wasteful domestic market, sapping the ultimate source of the Kremlin’s power.

We are naturally inclined to believe Mr. Putin when he says he will remain on the political stage. It is consistent with his past, and with our image of a non-democratic ruler. But we cannot ignore the possibility that he is engaged in a final, grand deception, and plans to bow out once his heir is in control. If the trick does come off and Mr. Medvedev eventually rules in his own right, let us all hope that he stops tinkering with the volatile authoritarian apparatus and allows a genuine democracy to emerge.

Tyler Roylance is an editorial assistant at Freedom House.